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A fundamental teaching of Buddhism describes the life of sentient beings as a state of 
suffering cyclically recurring from one incarnation to another. It is asserted that a root 
of the suffering is the essential misunderstanding of the way oneself and phenomena 
exist, or more exactly, the essential misunderstanding of the way the identity of oneself 
and phenomena is established. ‘Evil and suffering, that is, are the unintended yet 
inevitable consequences of our tendencies to reify relationships and processes into 
unchanging things, to abstract characteristics and qualities in terms of fixed essences 
or natures, and, most egregiously, to identify ourselves as singular, substantive selves in 
contrast to and standing apart from our surrounding, sustaining environments. Identity 
is thus not only a construct based upon an ignorant and untenable dichotomy between 
self and not-self, but also, almost inevitably, leads to attachment to “us” and “ours” and 
aggression toward “them” and “theirs”, the very processes that lead, in the extreme, to 
the horrible inhumanity we are attempting to understand’ (Waldron 2003, 147). 
As a result, we compose the world in a wrong way and live within the misconception 
that things exist concretely and continuously from their own side. This essential 
misconception entails imbalance and distortion between the observer and observable 
things that, in turns, entails afflicted states of consciousness and non-virtuous actions 
bringing harm to ourselves and others. 
After we are introduced to things, we obtain our identity, and after things are 
introduced to us, they obtain their identity. The next step after we all have been 
mutually identified is to protect our own identity even to the prejudice of the identity 
of the other. The Red Queen in Carroll’s story introduces Alice to the leg of mutton 
and then introduces the leg of mutton to Alice. Of course, Alice wants to cut a slice 
of the mutton, but Red Queen says, very decidedly: ‘it isn’t etiquette to cut anyone 
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you’ve been introduced to’. Unfortunately this etiquette doesn’t conform to our 
human condition; identified entities slice other identified entities into chunks in many 
ways. Identity requires permanently increasing support and protection from being 
destroyed, meaning it is necessary to protect one’s own identity to the prejudice of the 
identity of others. 
To correct this state of things, it is necessary to achieve the equal way of observing 
reality from all possible points. Knowable reality must become a subject of revision 
(critique). 
This essential critique of reality requires the existence of a specific attitude towards 
cognition and a highly elaborated epistemological background. In Indo-Tibetan 
Buddhism, this background is established by Madhyamaka–Yogācāra epistemology 
presented in various works by Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, Dharmakīrti, Dignāga, Vasubandhu, 
Chandrakīrti, and many other Indian and Tibetan commentators. 
Pramāṇa or valid cognition is of great importance for Mahāyāna soteriology 
for several reasons. First, ‘a valid cognition must be directed toward its object in 
accordance with the nature of the object. It is the agreement between the cognition’s 
intentionality and the nature of the object that constitutes the truth necessary to the 
validity of the cognition’ (Dreyfus 1997, 290). Thereby, in this case, intentional 
structures prepared to perceive reality as it is (yathābhūta) are arranged on the grounds 
of valid cognition. These intentional structures serve as a basis for determining the 
identity of ‘I’ and external things and respectively form preconditions for cutting 
off ignorance (avidyā) as a main root of suffering.  Second, ‘the content revealed 
by a cognition must be new. A mental episode that just repeats previously known 
information can be useful. It also can be true, but it is not valid in the technical sense 
of the word, for it does not bring anything new to the cognitive process’ (ibid.). The 
novelty of each moment of perception corresponds to the main characteristic of the 
flow of dharmas and thereby describes the process of cognition being in accordance 
with the cognisable object (i.e. with the flow of unconjugated, svalakṣaṇa dharmas). 
Soteriologically these two aspects of valid cognition—proper intentional structure 
and novelty—mean the removal of suffering and roots of suffering.
The theories of cognition are developed in various tenets of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism 
with varying levels of subtlety. The articles presented here discuss different aspects of 
theories of cognition in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. Six scholars from various countries 
collaborated here to produce a volume containing an in-depth study of Buddhist 
epistemology. 
Each author of this volume combines historical and philological scholarship 
with philosophical acumen and linguistic insight. Each of them uses original textual 
(Tibetan or Sanskrit) material to resolve logical issues and philosophical questions.
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Richard Payne opens our volume with an explanation of the epistemological role 
of the authority of the Buddha. ‘The historical integrity of Buddhism as a religious 
institution depends on the idea of lineage, that is on the authority of the Buddha 
Śākyamuni as the Awakened One, and the transfer of that authority to subsequent 
members of the Buddhist saṃgha. While having broader ramifications, to the extent, 
however, that the awakening of the Buddha has been understood (at least metaphorically) 
as the waking up from the sleep of ignorance (avidyā), the authority of the Buddha is 
itself an epistemological matter.’ Analysing different means of valid knowledge in 
Buddhism, Payne asserts that whereas Buddhist epistemologists ‘accepted two means 
of valid knowledge—perception and inference—eliminating testimony’, in the case of 
the authority of the Buddha they ‘did not eliminate testimony as a reliable means of 
knowledge, only that it was reducible to other means’. Comparing the role of testimony 
in Western and Buddhist epistemological traditions, Payne comes to the conclusion that 
the focus in ‘Western epistemological considerations of testimony is on the qualities 
or status of the speaker, broadly construed to include author, document, record, and 
so on. In contrast to this, in classic Indian discussions of śabdapramāṇa, the emphasis 
is placed much more on what is heard. The power that speech per se has is located in 
what might be called the “speech-event”, rather than in the speech-act’.
The theme of the means of valid cognition is continued through the article 
written by Marie Louise Friquegnon. Analysing Śāntarakṣita’s views on perception 
presented in The Ornament of the Middle Way (Madhyamakālaṁkāra) and its auto 
commentary Madhyamakālaṁkāravṛtti, as well as the position on appearances and 
emptiness presented by the 11th century Tibetan philosopher Rongzom Chokyi 
Zangpo, Friquegnon points out the hermeneutical difference between ‘some 
Madhyamaka philosophers who downgraded experiences and elevated the absolute’ 
and Śāntarakṣita’s and Rongzompa positions on the essential identity of appearance 
and emptiness. This identity establishes appearance as divine, or in other words, it 
establishes the identity of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. ‘Establishing appearances into 
the divine requires a perspectival shift. This shift is different than that involved in 
Wittgenstein’s switch from seeing a drawing as a duck to seeing it as a rabbit. In that 
case there is a subject that is seeing the object differently. What would it be like to 
achieve a total perspectival shift that dissolved the distinction between subject and 
object, that did not involve grasping at the object, and that was perfectly selfless?’
The theme of perception is continued in the article written by Bruce J. Stewart. 
The article is based on his own new translations from Sa skya Paṇḍita’s (1182–1251) 
Tshad ma rigs gter and is focused on ‘the defining characteristic and variegation of 
direct perception’ as a mean of valid cognition (tshad ma, pramāṇa). The article gives 
a wide and elaborative observation of Sa skya Paṇḍita’s epistemology concerning 
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direct perception. On the basis of Sa skya Paṇḍita and Go-rams pa’s works, Stewart 
analyses variegations of direct perception in various tenet systems of Buddhist 
philosophy. 
Perception from the corner of actuality and potentiality is analysed in the article by 
Viktoria Lysenko. She examines the concept of immediate perception (nirvikalpaka 
pratyakṣa) in various works written by Dignāga and finds an inconsistency in the 
understanding of an immediate perception being the ‘direct access of a non-propositional 
perception either to an external object or to its mental representation’ on the one hand 
and the immediate perception being ‘an entirely interior process that proceeds, without 
the help of any external object’ on the other hand. Viktoria Lysenko proposes ‘to 
understand these two approaches in terms of upāya kauśalya—skilful means’.
Perception from the corner of Madhyamaka epistemology is analysed in the article 
by Sonam Thakchoe. First he introduces us to a brief summary of Prāsaṅgika theory of 
perception and then presents Candrakīrti’s alternative theory of perception, ‘a radical 
departure from the Pramāṇika’s account. It is almost a complete reverse of the latter’. 
According to Sonam Thakchoe, the radicalism of Candrakīrti’s epistemology lies 
particularly in the description of reliable epistemic sources. ‘Candrakīrti advances 
his arguments by insisting that perceptions effectively function as reliable epistemic 
resources strictly on the grounds that they are unreal and lack any intrinsic nature, for 
only such an exclusive ontological reason warrants the perceptual faculties to become 
reliable epistemic resources’.
Our volume concludes with Vladimir Korobov’s attempt to describe the 
epistemic functions of bodhicitta. The article is based on the second chapter of 
the Guhyasamājatantra and Kamalaśīla’s work Bodhicitta-Bhāvanā, a commentary 
on verses proclaimed by Tathagāgata Vairocana in the second chapter of the 
Guhyasamājatantra. The article explores the understanding of bodhicitta as a kind of 
cognitive strategy and/or a specific instrument of cognition in Tantric Buddhism that 
is situated and functions beyond reach of vijñāna. The author presents the Tantric way 
of cognition as a process of imitating (or representing) ultimate reality within saṃsāra. 
Bodhicitta in this case may be understood as a practical strategy of cognition based 
on mimesis or imitation (with an element of passion for imitation) of ultimate reality 
(dharmatā, śūnyatā, yathābhūta, tathatā) by different means within the saṃsāra.
To sum up, this volume presents different aspects of theories of cognition in Indo-
Tibetan Buddhism. The authors present their own understanding of difficult points of 
epistemology, and these attempts obviously inspire new ideas not only in the study of 
Buddhist epistemology but in the field of Western philosophy as well.
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